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Missed Opportunities
Over the past sixteen years, the international community has gone from seeing the independence of the Central Asian states as primarily a source of security threats to an area that is potentially a real strategic prize, despite the proximity of the region to Afghanistan and that country’s seemingly endless civil war and internal confusion.
Much of the change in perceptions comes from the increased knowledge of the region’s energy reserves. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have enough oil and gas to become serious swing providers, especially for states that are now dependent upon shipments from Russia or those who would like to decrease their dependence upon Persian Gulf suppliers.
The changes in the international community’s assessment of the importance of the Central Asian states are also partly the result of a significantly altered global security environment after September 11, 2001. The U.S. military action in Afghanistan and Iraq shook up of the status quo in much of the broader Middle East, including Iran and Turkey. It also led to a worsening of relations between Russia and both the U.S. and Europe, where most countries (the U.K. excluded) initially opposed the U.S.-led invasion, but who have subsequently refrained from public criticism of the ongoing war effort. In this environment, the Central Asian states appear less fragile than in their first years after independence, especially given the added importance of their oil and gas reserves.
However, excluding efforts in the commercial sector, the international community’s engagement in Central Asia has been in fits and starts, with limited resources offered to help the Central Asians tackle the serious challenges the region faces. This is unfortunate, as the area continues to harbor serious long-term security risks. Many of these relate to the incomplete nature of both economic reform and political institution-building, which has resulted in a buildup of unsolved problems in each of the Central Asian countries.
From the very first days of independence, Central Asia’s leaders looked with to the U.S. with the hope that Washington would somehow take to their cause in a fashion roughly analogous to its embrace of the politically transformed states of the former Warsaw Pact. Although they recognized that they would, by necessity of their shared geography (and their landlocked nature), maintain close ties to Russia, each leader wanted to develop a unique international face for his country.
