The most striking thing about this year is that Central Asia's leaders have shown their skills in successfully merging old with new.

One party rule has returned to the region; Kazakhstan's Nur Otan party was the only one to make it "past the post" with the required seven percent minimum in the August 2007 Majlis elections. Kazakhstan, though, has been accepted as a proto-European country as the Kazakhs got the OSCE chairmanship that they so strongly lobbied for, and only a year later -- 2010 -- than they sought; they also promised to not change the basic institutions of the organization, including ODIHR.

Old leaders have gotten new leases on political life, while a "new generation" leader has developed what appear to be sturdy political roots. The Kazakh constitution has been modified to allow Nursultan Nazarbayev to continue to run for office should he choose to when his current term expires in 2012, while Islam Karimov has offered his own unstated interpretation of the Uzbek constitution. He simply declared his candidacy and faces certain victory on December 23.

Turkmenistan's president Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov is proving much more of a political master than many anticipated. Not only has he held onto power, but he traveled to New York and Brussels basically to announce that Turkmenistan was reopened for international business. But just when U.S. and EU energy experts were getting their hopes up that Turkmen gas might be shipped more directly to market under the Caspian, he signed a new gas deal with Russia, albeit a much better one than the Turkmen have ever been offered before, so the threat of competition was of clear benefit to Ashgabat.

The most striking thing about this year is that Central Asia's leaders have shown their skills in successfully merging old with new.

One party rule has returned to the region; Kazakhstan's Nur Otan party was the only one to make it "past the post" with the required seven percent minimum in the August 2007 Majlis elections. Kazakhstan, though, has been accepted as a proto-European country as the Kazakhs got the OSCE chairmanship that they so strongly lobbied for, and only a year later -- 2010 -- than they sought; they also promised to not change the basic institutions of the organization, including ODIHR.

Old leaders have gotten new leases on political life, while a "new generation" leader has developed what appear to be sturdy political roots. The Kazakh constitution has been modified to allow Nursultan Nazarbayev to continue to run for office should he choose to when his current term expires in 2012, while Islam Karimov has offered his own unstated interpretation of the Uzbek constitution. He simply declared his candidacy and faces certain victory on December 23.

Turkmenistan's president Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov is proving much more of a political master than many anticipated. Not only has he held onto power, but he traveled to New York and Brussels basically to announce that Turkmenistan was reopened for international business. But just when U.S. and EU energy experts were getting their hopes up that Turkmen gas might be shipped more directly to market under the Caspian, he signed a new gas deal with Russia, albeit a much better one than the Turkmen have ever been offered before, so the threat of competition was of clear benefit to Ashgabat.

The most striking thing about this year is that Central Asia's leaders have shown their skills in successfully merging old with new.

One party rule has returned to the region; Kazakhstan's Nur Otan party was the only one to make it "past the post" with the required seven percent minimum in the August 2007 Majlis elections. Kazakhstan, though, has been accepted as a proto-European country as the Kazakhs got the OSCE chairmanship that they so strongly lobbied for, and only a year later -- 2010 -- than they sought; they also promised to not change the basic institutions of the organization, including ODIHR.

Old leaders have gotten new leases on political life, while a "new generation" leader has developed what appear to be sturdy political roots. The Kazakh constitution has been modified to allow Nursultan Nazarbayev to continue to run for office should he choose to when his current term expires in 2012, while Islam Karimov has offered his own unstated interpretation of the Uzbek constitution. He simply declared his candidacy and faces certain victory on December 23.

Turkmenistan's president Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov is proving much more of a political master than many anticipated. Not only has he held onto power, but he traveled to New York and Brussels basically to announce that Turkmenistan was reopened for international business. But just when U.S. and EU energy experts were getting their hopes up that Turkmen gas might be shipped more directly to market under the Caspian, he signed a new gas deal with Russia, albeit a much better one than the Turkmen have ever been offered before, so the threat of competition was of clear benefit to Ashgabat.

Paper was originally prepared for the First Asia-Euro International Academic Forum on "The New Silk Road and a Harmonious World"

The last fifteen years have seen extraordinary changes along the New Silk Road. Each of the five Central Asian states have passed through a challenging transition period, with each now forging a unique international presence. The new face of Central Asia remains yet to be carved. Over the last four or five years some of these countries have turned into much more self-assertive actors, while others have begun what might turn out to be long and difficult transition periods. Worse yet, the challenges of transition are still to be confronted by the rest of the states in the region, as they are still ruled by Soviet era figures. All of this underscores the importance of developing a satisfactory regional cooperation mechanism.

Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan has become a self-confident actor in the Central Asian region, and beyond. In less than twenty years they have developed a foreign service whose representatives now span the globe, and represent their government with the highest level of professionalism. This feat is all the more admirable in that the country inherited only a small albeit very talented number of professional diplomats, including the current General Secretary of the SCO, H.E. Bulat Nurgaliev, and long-time Kazakh Foreign Minister Kassymzhomart Tokaev. Kazakhstan is also developing a unique national identity, based in part on the cultural values that ethnic Kazakhs attribute to their nomadic heritage, and in part based on the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional nature of the mosaic of the 100 or more nationalities that live in the country.

Paper was originally prepared for the First Asia-Euro International Academic Forum on "The New Silk Road and a Harmonious World"

The last fifteen years have seen extraordinary changes along the New Silk Road. Each of the five Central Asian states have passed through a challenging transition period, with each now forging a unique international presence. The new face of Central Asia remains yet to be carved. Over the last four or five years some of these countries have turned into much more self-assertive actors, while others have begun what might turn out to be long and difficult transition periods. Worse yet, the challenges of transition are still to be confronted by the rest of the states in the region, as they are still ruled by Soviet era figures. All of this underscores the importance of developing a satisfactory regional cooperation mechanism.

Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan has become a self-confident actor in the Central Asian region, and beyond. In less than twenty years they have developed a foreign service whose representatives now span the globe, and represent their government with the highest level of professionalism. This feat is all the more admirable in that the country inherited only a small albeit very talented number of professional diplomats, including the current General Secretary of the SCO, H.E. Bulat Nurgaliev, and long-time Kazakh Foreign Minister Kassymzhomart Tokaev. Kazakhstan is also developing a unique national identity, based in part on the cultural values that ethnic Kazakhs attribute to their nomadic heritage, and in part based on the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional nature of the mosaic of the 100 or more nationalities that live in the country.

Paper was originally prepared for the First Asia-Euro International Academic Forum on "The New Silk Road and a Harmonious World"

The last fifteen years have seen extraordinary changes along the New Silk Road. Each of the five Central Asian states have passed through a challenging transition period, with each now forging a unique international presence. The new face of Central Asia remains yet to be carved. Over the last four or five years some of these countries have turned into much more self-assertive actors, while others have begun what might turn out to be long and difficult transition periods. Worse yet, the challenges of transition are still to be confronted by the rest of the states in the region, as they are still ruled by Soviet era figures. All of this underscores the importance of developing a satisfactory regional cooperation mechanism.

Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan has become a self-confident actor in the Central Asian region, and beyond. In less than twenty years they have developed a foreign service whose representatives now span the globe, and represent their government with the highest level of professionalism. This feat is all the more admirable in that the country inherited only a small albeit very talented number of professional diplomats, including the current General Secretary of the SCO, H.E. Bulat Nurgaliev, and long-time Kazakh Foreign Minister Kassymzhomart Tokaev. Kazakhstan is also developing a unique national identity, based in part on the cultural values that ethnic Kazakhs attribute to their nomadic heritage, and in part based on the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional nature of the mosaic of the 100 or more nationalities that live in the country.

This system has partially evolved since independence, with states negotiating annual water quotas on a multilateral and bilateral basis. Moreover in recent years there has been an effort made in these bilateral negotiations to negotiate gas and hyrdroelectric power simultaneously (with Uzbekistan providing gas, for both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and receiving hydroelectric power in return. But the current patterns of water usage, having to balance water for irrigation with the needs of hydroelectric power generation leaves upstream producers short of electricity themselves in winter. The energy shortages are particularly acute in Tajikistan.

This system has partially evolved since independence, with states negotiating annual water quotas on a multilateral and bilateral basis. Moreover in recent years there has been an effort made in these bilateral negotiations to negotiate gas and hyrdroelectric power simultaneously (with Uzbekistan providing gas, for both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and receiving hydroelectric power in return. But the current patterns of water usage, having to balance water for irrigation with the needs of hydroelectric power generation leaves upstream producers short of electricity themselves in winter. The energy shortages are particularly acute in Tajikistan.

This system has partially evolved since independence, with states negotiating annual water quotas on a multilateral and bilateral basis. Moreover in recent years there has been an effort made in these bilateral negotiations to negotiate gas and hyrdroelectric power simultaneously (with Uzbekistan providing gas, for both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and receiving hydroelectric power in return. But the current patterns of water usage, having to balance water for irrigation with the needs of hydroelectric power generation leaves upstream producers short of electricity themselves in winter. The energy shortages are particularly acute in Tajikistan.

Find original article in The Moscow Times here

Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov is having a kind of coming out party in New York this week, ending the self-imposed semi-isolation into which late former President Saparmurat Niyazov plunged Turkmenistan and its top leadership.

The youthful Turkmen president has a busy schedule ahead of him. In addition to having met with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Tuesday, he will address the United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday; he is sure to be sought after by senior European diplomats attending the annual meeting. In addition, he will give a speech before an audience at Columbia University and at a smaller meeting organized by the Eurasia Group, a New York-based political risk advisory and consulting firm.

The United States and the Europeans are eager to convince the Turkmen president that they are ideal partners for cooperation in the energy sphere, that they can bring the most modern technology available into upstream production and can teach the Turkmen how to best protect their national interests through maximizing the sanctity of contracts. In addition, the U.S. hosts and their European partners hope to provide Berdymukhammedov with a reliable transportation alternative to Russia's and China's in the form of a new gas pipeline that goes under the Caspian Sea and connects with the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline.

Find original article in The Moscow Times here

Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov is having a kind of coming out party in New York this week, ending the self-imposed semi-isolation into which late former President Saparmurat Niyazov plunged Turkmenistan and its top leadership.

The youthful Turkmen president has a busy schedule ahead of him. In addition to having met with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Tuesday, he will address the United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday; he is sure to be sought after by senior European diplomats attending the annual meeting. In addition, he will give a speech before an audience at Columbia University and at a smaller meeting organized by the Eurasia Group, a New York-based political risk advisory and consulting firm.

The United States and the Europeans are eager to convince the Turkmen president that they are ideal partners for cooperation in the energy sphere, that they can bring the most modern technology available into upstream production and can teach the Turkmen how to best protect their national interests through maximizing the sanctity of contracts. In addition, the U.S. hosts and their European partners hope to provide Berdymukhammedov with a reliable transportation alternative to Russia's and China's in the form of a new gas pipeline that goes under the Caspian Sea and connects with the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline.

Find original article in The Moscow Times here

Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov is having a kind of coming out party in New York this week, ending the self-imposed semi-isolation into which late former President Saparmurat Niyazov plunged Turkmenistan and its top leadership.

The youthful Turkmen president has a busy schedule ahead of him. In addition to having met with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Tuesday, he will address the United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday; he is sure to be sought after by senior European diplomats attending the annual meeting. In addition, he will give a speech before an audience at Columbia University and at a smaller meeting organized by the Eurasia Group, a New York-based political risk advisory and consulting firm.

The United States and the Europeans are eager to convince the Turkmen president that they are ideal partners for cooperation in the energy sphere, that they can bring the most modern technology available into upstream production and can teach the Turkmen how to best protect their national interests through maximizing the sanctity of contracts. In addition, the U.S. hosts and their European partners hope to provide Berdymukhammedov with a reliable transportation alternative to Russia's and China's in the form of a new gas pipeline that goes under the Caspian Sea and connects with the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline.

Over the past sixteen years, the international community has gone from seeing the independence of the Central Asian states as primarily a source of security threats to an area that is potentially a real strategic prize, despite the proximity of the region to Afghanistan and that country's seemingly endless civil war and internal confusion.

Much of the change in perceptions comes from the increased knowledge of the region's energy reserves. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have enough oil and gas to become serious swing providers, especially for states that are now dependent upon shipments from Russia or those who would like to decrease their dependence upon Persian Gulf suppliers.

The changes in the international community's assessment of the importance of the Central Asian states are also partly the result of a significantly altered global security environment after September 11, 2001. The U.S. military action in Afghanistan and Iraq shook up of the status quo in much of the broader Middle East, including Iran and Turkey. It also led to a worsening of relations between Russia and both the U.S. and Europe, where most countries (the U.K. excluded) initially opposed the U.S.-led invasion, but who have subsequently refrained from public criticism of the ongoing war effort. In this environment, the Central Asian states appear less fragile than in their first years after independence, especially given the added importance of their oil and gas reserves.

However, excluding efforts in the commercial sector, the international community's engagement in Central Asia has been in fits and starts, with limited resources offered to help the Central Asians tackle the serious challenges the region faces. This is unfortunate, as the area continues to harbor serious long-term security risks. Many of these relate to the incomplete nature of both economic reform and political institution-building, which has resulted in a buildup of unsolved problems in each of the Central Asian countries.

From the very first days of independence, Central Asia's leaders looked with to the U.S. with the hope that Washington would somehow take to their cause in a fashion roughly analogous to its embrace of the politically transformed states of the former Warsaw Pact. Although they recognized that they would, by necessity of their shared geography (and their landlocked nature), maintain close ties to Russia, each leader wanted to develop a unique international face for his country.

Over the past sixteen years, the international community has gone from seeing the independence of the Central Asian states as primarily a source of security threats to an area that is potentially a real strategic prize, despite the proximity of the region to Afghanistan and that country's seemingly endless civil war and internal confusion.

Much of the change in perceptions comes from the increased knowledge of the region's energy reserves. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have enough oil and gas to become serious swing providers, especially for states that are now dependent upon shipments from Russia or those who would like to decrease their dependence upon Persian Gulf suppliers.

The changes in the international community's assessment of the importance of the Central Asian states are also partly the result of a significantly altered global security environment after September 11, 2001. The U.S. military action in Afghanistan and Iraq shook up of the status quo in much of the broader Middle East, including Iran and Turkey. It also led to a worsening of relations between Russia and both the U.S. and Europe, where most countries (the U.K. excluded) initially opposed the U.S.-led invasion, but who have subsequently refrained from public criticism of the ongoing war effort. In this environment, the Central Asian states appear less fragile than in their first years after independence, especially given the added importance of their oil and gas reserves.

However, excluding efforts in the commercial sector, the international community's engagement in Central Asia has been in fits and starts, with limited resources offered to help the Central Asians tackle the serious challenges the region faces. This is unfortunate, as the area continues to harbor serious long-term security risks. Many of these relate to the incomplete nature of both economic reform and political institution-building, which has resulted in a buildup of unsolved problems in each of the Central Asian countries.

From the very first days of independence, Central Asia's leaders looked with to the U.S. with the hope that Washington would somehow take to their cause in a fashion roughly analogous to its embrace of the politically transformed states of the former Warsaw Pact. Although they recognized that they would, by necessity of their shared geography (and their landlocked nature), maintain close ties to Russia, each leader wanted to develop a unique international face for his country.

Over the past sixteen years, the international community has gone from seeing the independence of the Central Asian states as primarily a source of security threats to an area that is potentially a real strategic prize, despite the proximity of the region to Afghanistan and that country's seemingly endless civil war and internal confusion.

Much of the change in perceptions comes from the increased knowledge of the region's energy reserves. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have enough oil and gas to become serious swing providers, especially for states that are now dependent upon shipments from Russia or those who would like to decrease their dependence upon Persian Gulf suppliers.

The changes in the international community's assessment of the importance of the Central Asian states are also partly the result of a significantly altered global security environment after September 11, 2001. The U.S. military action in Afghanistan and Iraq shook up of the status quo in much of the broader Middle East, including Iran and Turkey. It also led to a worsening of relations between Russia and both the U.S. and Europe, where most countries (the U.K. excluded) initially opposed the U.S.-led invasion, but who have subsequently refrained from public criticism of the ongoing war effort. In this environment, the Central Asian states appear less fragile than in their first years after independence, especially given the added importance of their oil and gas reserves.

However, excluding efforts in the commercial sector, the international community's engagement in Central Asia has been in fits and starts, with limited resources offered to help the Central Asians tackle the serious challenges the region faces. This is unfortunate, as the area continues to harbor serious long-term security risks. Many of these relate to the incomplete nature of both economic reform and political institution-building, which has resulted in a buildup of unsolved problems in each of the Central Asian countries.

From the very first days of independence, Central Asia's leaders looked with to the U.S. with the hope that Washington would somehow take to their cause in a fashion roughly analogous to its embrace of the politically transformed states of the former Warsaw Pact. Although they recognized that they would, by necessity of their shared geography (and their landlocked nature), maintain close ties to Russia, each leader wanted to develop a unique international face for his country.