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One of the major potential sources of future inter-ethnic conflict is competition over water. Throughout the Soviet period there was a highly developed system for allocating water resources from the Amur Darya and Syr Darya water basins, which provide virtually all of the water for four of the Central Asian states and for southern Kazakhstan. The administrative structure for this system, in which all five Central Asian states participated, was located in Tashkent, and the pattern of water allocation was designed to favor the downstream users (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and the southern part of Kazakhstan) who needed the water for irrigated agriculture (especially cotton), rather than the upstream providers of the water (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), who did have ample water allocated for their agricultural usage. Now since independence the upstream providers have a complementary need, to create and sell hydroelectric power.
This system has partially evolved since independence, with states negotiating annual water quotas on a multilateral and bilateral basis. Moreover in recent years there has been an effort made in these bilateral negotiations to negotiate gas and hyrdroelectric power simultaneously (with Uzbekistan providing gas, for both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and receiving hydroelectric power in return. But the current patterns of water usage, having to balance water for irrigation with the needs of hydroelectric power generation leaves upstream producers short of electricity themselves in winter. The energy shortages are particularly acute in Tajikistan.
There were several different international efforts to work out a new regional mechanism in the first decade of independence. Some were made by Russia, and others by the UK (with strong US support), there have also been a number of international efforts (supported by the World Bank, EBRD and the ADB) to increase energy efficiency and better water utilization.
But since the ouster of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the attention has been on the creation of new sources of hydroelectric power in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in part to spur economic recovery in Afghanistan, but also to spur economic recovery in these states themselves. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have received competing proposals for projects from the any number of international players, including Russia, the US, Iran and China, and there are even competing proposals from various entrepreneurs within some of these countries.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization seeks to expand upon its early mission to include a much degree of economic cooperation, in trade, and most notably in the critical energy sector. Energy makes a key contribution to the economy of every state in the region, some through oil and gas, others through the prospect of hydro-electric power, and the region’s energy potential defines much of its interest for the broader international community.
Much of the attention paid to Central Asia is tied to fossil fuels in particular, and less attention to hydroelectric power. While the Shanghai Cooperation Organization may come to play a useful role in the fossil fuel sector
Not to diminish the role that the SCO can play in this sector it cannot change geography. Unfortunately this is at the core of many of the thorniest conflicts in this region about the transport of oil and gas. As this land-locked region is dependent upon getting its oil and gas to port and that gives certain states commercial advantages over others. And although SCO can provide a forum for discussion of disputes, which will serve as a form of confidence building, it is hard for me to believe that it can be an impartial forum for regulating the conflicting commercial interests of the various member states, precisely because the various commercial interests are in fact conflicting.
Even for the SCO to be an effective source of discussion for common problems in the fossil fuel area, and for facilitating cross border trade in this sector, membership in the organization would have to be increased. Even if Turkmenistan joins and Iran and Afghanistan go from observers to full members, and Azerbaijan would need to be invited into the organization as well, for their can be no serious discussion about the Caspian without Azerbaijan’s participation, and Turkey would need some sort of presence, even if only as an observer.
This would change the nature of the organization and would, in my opinion at least, have a substantially negative impact on its potential effectiveness, making it into a smaller and much less effective OPEC.
However the SCO does not need an expanded membership to play a major role in the area of water management and hydro-electric power. Here too, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan’s presence, at least as observers would be optimal, but there is no need for an otherwise expanded membership to consider these questions.
While the SCO has been focusing on three particular security risks—-terrorism, extremism and secession—-the greatest risks facing the Central Asian states may well lie with a far more tradition risk, the competition for water resources. As this paper argues, the various states in the region have matured considerably over the last half decade, and each is now more capable than ever of managing a highly nuanced and successful foreign policy. Now, in distinction to early periods, a highly complex issue such as regional water management is no longer beyond the reach of the states in the region, and the SCO may well prove to be an appropriate forum to make progress with it, freeing all the states in the region to develop their energy potential in an atmosphere or cooperation and harmony.
Martha Brill Olcott
Senior Associate
