While Central Asian leaders often criticize the U.S. and Europe for meddling too deeply in their affairs, I believe we were not proactive enough in promoting either political or economic reform in the region. Supporting reform in Central Asia was neither a priority of the U.S. nor of Europe, and it was something we provided more verbal support for than monetary assistance, and what money we spent largely went to foreign salaries, administrative overhead, travel and equipment.

Western policies in this region became captive of our attitude toward Russia. When relations with Russia were warmest, the U.S. and Europe were willing to give Moscow a free hand, but they increased their engagement in the mid- 1990s when relationships with Russia began to sour. And of course, after September 11, 2001, the U.S. and NATO more generally needed a presence in Central Asia to facilitate military operations in Afghanistan.

Now once again, Europe and also the US are eager to deepen their engagement with the Central Asian states, in large part to secure alternative sources of energy. But if they want to influence developments in these states, they should look hard at some of the assumptions they have about the terms of engagement.

I would recommend the following:

First, we should make more of an effort to view events in this region through a locally focused lens. Too much of what we have done, or not done, in the region was shaped by what we thought about outside influences that were active there.

Secondly, in more recent years, there has been something of a tendency to use certain “outlying” states in the region, like Uzbekistan, as ways to appease our own domestic human rights constituencies. This is especially true in the current political environment, in which the U.S. and the U.K. are deeply entrenched in an unpopular military operation in Iraq that was rooted in the alleged defense of a “freedom” agenda.

Thirdly, I think that the U.S. and its various European partners make a big mistake in not trying to engage the existing governments. E.U. or U.S. sanctions, absent strong international backing, do not have the intended effect, forcing a sufficient level of deprivation to modify their behavior. This is especially true in Central Asia, where Russia and China offer ready outlets.

Fourthly, a policy of sanctions designed to create regime change engenders more risks than it potentially solves. This is particularly true in a country like Uzbekistan, where few would feel competent to predict what would come next.

Fifthly, we should be sensitive to the fact that the “War on Terror” has introduced a set of new ambiguities into the international arena. Western democracies have granted limited use of extraordinary powers to the executive branch, licensing special tribunals, and removing some basic legal protections when it is claimed that national security is threatened. We view the threats we face as real, and so serious that they justify the temporary suspension of some of our long accepted civil rights. Those in Central Asia that are most cynical, simply argue that powerful states can maintain a double standard forcing weaker states to accept standards that they themselves will not accept.

Sixthly, we must learn to be more flexible in our approach in dealing with these states. We shouldn’t approach them with a democracy check - list, and if they fail to do anything on it - register western-funded NGO’s, offer an unfettered political environment for independent media, offer no roadblocks to the functioning of non-governmental and opposition political groups - we mark them down as failing and oftentimes restrict certain features of our diplomatic or foreign assistance engagement with them.

Finally, we should move away from a “we-they” understanding of events in this region, and learn to be more inclusive in our approach. We need to do a better job of avoiding manipulation by the Central Asians themselves. The “classic” is the multiple messages they send to their various international partners, stressing their anger with Moscow in Washington, and their frustration with Washington while in Moscow, and repeating much the same pattern in Beijing and in the various European capitals. The only thing that changes is that the identity of “the big bad wolf” changes.

This increases the tendency for developing competing programs and projects. Russia and China have one form of security engagement with the Central Asian states, through the CSTO and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. We have another, using NATO.

We continue to develop very conflicting notions of threat, and how threat is appropriately avoided and addressed. And even in trying to solve common problems, like the situation in Afghanistan, the means sought to provide solutions, in this case a NATO led military and internationally funded reconstruction effort, doesn’t provide equal entry for all parties. In the long run, this is as bad for the various Central Asian states as it is for the outside actors who seek to influence them.

Martha Brill Olcott
Senior Associate